Can career incentives, accelerated or delayed promotion based on performance, improve teacher performance and student learning? If so, is it more cost effective to provide career incentives for headteachers, teachers, or both?
Pakistan has low student learning levels and accountability is a pervasive problem. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Elementary and Secondary Education (E&SE) Department wants to improve learning by increasing teacher and headteacher accountability through the reform of two dysfunctional accountability systems. Teachers have annual teacher performance evaluations with scores linked to promotions, but they are conducted at the end of the calendar year (overlapping two school years), performed by headteachers who find it difficult to criticize colleagues, and do not include teaching-specific measures known to improve learning. Headteachers face school inspections, but they are irregular, unstructured, and results often unreported. Thus, neither system motivates effort.
This research project aim to examine if career incentives (accelerated or delayed promotion based on performance) can improve teacher performance and student learning? If so, is it more cost effective to provide career incentives for headteachers, teachers, or both?
