When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: A Relational Contracting Experiment in Ghana
This data is made available by the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford. Permission for use of the data for academic research is given by the Centre. We would ask that the use of the data, its sources, and the financing for the surveys be acknowledged.
This data was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as part of the Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (iiG), a research consortium aimed at studying how to improve institutions in Africa and South-Asia. Any views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.
The data available here is for the following iiG working paper:
Elwyn Davies, Marcel Fafchamps, "When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: A Relational Contracting Experiment in Ghana". CSAE WPS/2015-08, Mar 2015.