I’m writing this introduction as a relatively new member of CSAE, and one without a background in research. Instead, my career has been mostly in a major bilateral development agency (DFID), with opportunities also to observe the World Bank and the EU at close quarters, as well as chairing the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

What I find consistently stimulating about the work at CSAE is its combination of analytical rigour and real-world involvement, and the way in which this highlights important messages for policymakers.

The studies highlighted in this Newsletter display all these features.

The results are sometimes consistent with one’s expectations – genocide leads to higher returns to labour, civil war destruction of infrastructure lowers it, as Pieter Seermels and Marijke Verpoorten document in Rwanda; cash transfers help mayors get re-elected where there is a competitive election, as Julien Labonne establishes in the Philippines. But often they are not: for example in the Philippines case there is no difference in the share of the vote for the incumbent between villages that were part of the programme and villages that were not, probably because incumbent mayors compensated households in control villages by redistributing their own budget. And Vézina, Rotundo and Zhang argue that the concessions to African textile producers under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act seem to have been much less influential once US restrictions on Chinese textile exports were lifted in 2004, implying that much of the previous surge of African textile exports was led by low value-added transhipment of Chinese exports seeking to avoid quotas.

Policy conclusions from this work are also sometimes challenging. For example, Labonne questions the automatic reflex of policy-makers to concentrate cash transfers on the poor (where over time they may simply cement the status quo). The Collier and Venables working paper, ‘Greening Africa? Technologies, endowments and the latecomer effect’ (CSAE WPS-2012-06) questions the assumption that Africa should be pushed to adopt cutting-edge but not yet economically viable ‘green’ solutions to its energy problems.

Looking forward, Simon Quinn and Marcel Fafchamps introduce a ‘Dragon’s Den’ project that makes grants of $1,000 to young entrepreneurs with credible business plans in three African countries, and which CSAE will be monitoring carefully to see the results.

But perhaps the most significant piece of all is the one on national statistics offices by Justin Sandefur. How can Tanzania be growing so fast, if poverty is hardly falling and inequality increasing only marginally? The suggested answer – that the National Statistics Office is badly undercounting inflation – should send serious waves of anxiety to both researchers and policymakers about the real quality of statistics in many countries, and about the incentives that national statisticians face. It’s high time to press on with not just capacity-building but much more institutional independence for African statisticians.

Richard Manning is a Senior Research Associate at the CSAE
The rise and fall of (Chinese) African apparel exports

EVEN THE TINIEST SIGNS OF industrial take-off in Africa always attract the attention of economists and policymakers, both of whom are eagerly waiting for the elusive African growth miracle. One such episode of excitement was the surge of apparel exports that followed the implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the US in October 2000.

AGOA, which enabled some African countries to export over 4,000 products, including hundreds of apparel products, quota-free and duty-free to the US, is widely regarded as a trade-policy success. Yet the export surge has not survived the 2005 demise of the Multifibre Agreement, when Chinese exports, no longer facing US quotas, took over, and has not been accompanied by dynamic growth benefits. As seen in Figure 1, exports from AGOA’s three most successful exporters as well as AGOA as a whole peaked in 2004 and it was all downhill after that.

A recent CSAE working paper by Lorenzo Rotunno, Pierre-Louis Vézina, and Zheng Wang (CSAE WPS/2012-12) argues the success was rapid but short-lived as a large share of AGOA exports were in fact Chinese exports transhipped through AGOA to circumvent now-abolished US quotas and on top benefit from duty-free treatment.

How US trade policies inadvertently turned Africa into a trade corridor for China

The quotas imposed on Chinese exports during the Multifibre Agreement guaranteed smaller developing countries access to the US market. This implicit export subsidy for African countries, coupled with AGOA preferences, was thus a golden opportunity for African apparel exporters.
has been all over the news. Chinese and Taiwanese producers formed the
bulk of a textile ‘diaspora’ in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Kenya. In the
Kenyan Export Processing Zone, 80% of the 34 garment plants had
Asian owners. What’s more, the inputs of apparel firms in Africa were
most often Chinese. For example, Lesotho firms typically provide assembly,
packaging and shipping services and depend on their Asian headquarters
to send them the fabric they need.

Tracing transhipment

We go further than the anecdotal evidence by empirically tracing the
transhipment from China to the US via Africa. More precisely, we show that
Chinese apparel exports to AGOA countries predict these countries’
exports to the US. To show that this correlation, which we label
transhipment elasticity, indeed captures transhipment, we show it
only holds in countries which didn’t face any rules of origin within
AGOA, and only for products bound by US quotas on Chinese exports. In
other words we find traces of transhipment unnecessary and thus led to the
departure of footloose factories and the fall of AGOA exports.

The Chinese wave in Africa

The suspicion that AGOA and US quotas on Chinese exports spurred a
Chinese manufacturing wave in Africa consequences of economic policies,
in this case the transhipment that resulted from the combination of US
quotas against China and unrestricted preferences for Africa. This
transhipment explains the surprisingly fast and robust impact AGOA had on
apparel exports to the US. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the policy combination
may account for as much as 64% of Botswana’s apparel exports, 45% of
Kenya’s, 35% of Madagascar’s, and 23% of Lesotho’s. Yet this rapid rise
and fall warns that supply-chain industrialisation may lead to fast
growth but can have limited spillovers and comes with the risk of further
re-locations of production. Development-focused trade policies
should thus pay special attention to the fickleness of production
fragmentation.

Policy implications

In a nutshell, our research provides evidence on the unintended

TO FIND OUT MORE

ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS
Pierre-Louis Vézina is Postdoctoral Fellow at OxCare and CSAE. His work
concentrates on Africa’s export performance and on the unintended
consequences of trade policies.

Lorenzo Rotunno is a PhD student at the
Graduate Institute, Geneva. His research
interests are in illicit trade and the
political economy of trade agreements.

Zheng Wang is Assistant Professor at
the University of Nottingham, Ningbo
China. His work focuses on Chinese
firms’ response to trade policy.

ABOUT THE RESEARCH
The rise and fall of (Chinese) African
apparel exports, CSAE working paper
WPS/2012-12

http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/working
papers/pdfs/csaewps2012-12.pdf

A version of this item also appears on
the CSAE blog site at http://~blog.
csa.e.ox.ac.uk/
IN 2011, THE CENTRE FOR THE Study of African Economies ran the ‘Aspire Business Ideas Competition’, in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia. This was a competition to encourage young entrepreneurs in Africa. There are many reasons that such young entrepreneurs are likely to be important for Africa’s sustained growth and development – for example, by encouraging the adoption of new business technologies, and by creating new jobs. Business ideas competitions are an increasingly common feature of the African business landscape - for example, Project Inspire Africa is a reality television competition designed to test and reward young entrepreneurs from Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

Our competition was modelled loosely on the popular television programme Dragon’s Den. We invited aspiring young entrepreneurs aged between 18 and 25 to submit short business plans, and then to discuss and defend those business plans in front of judging panels comprising managers of established African manufacturing firms. Each judging panel reviewed 12 applications, and each panel awarded a single prize of US$1,000 to the best application.

The competition itself was funded by the World Bank to improve understanding of the role of social networks for diffusion and adoption of new management practices, as part of its Research Program on African Competitiveness in Light, Simple Manufactured Goods. Because competition judges were randomly assigned to different judging panels, we can use the competition to measure the consequences for business managers of meeting new colleagues, who may bring new ideas and new perspectives to established firms.

The competition also provides a unique opportunity to learn about the way that new enterprises are formed in Africa, and to think about the way that policy can encourage young Africans to develop new business ideas. Previous research in both Sri Lanka and in Ghana has studied the effect of small grants for microenterprises – that is, grants of about US$200, given to a random set of entrepreneurs from a representative sample of very small firms. However, no previous work has considered the value of substantial seed funding for a sample of high-achieving young entrepreneurs with developed business plans. This is a critically important scenario for measuring the potential for innovative new seed investment in encouraging new entrepreneurship in Africa. It is also precisely the scenario that the Aspire Business Ideas Competition provides.

The iiG has entered into a research phase specifically focussed on Growth, Firms and Markets and as part of this theme has funded follow-up surveys of the young entrepreneurs who participated in the Aspire Business Ideas Competition. These surveys – currently in progress in all three participating countries – will provide valuable new insights on young African entrepreneurs, in several different ways:

• We will measure the entrepreneurs’ successes and failures in creating their planned new business ventures;
• We will measure the entrepreneurs’ income from their enterprises, and from any wage jobs;
• We will learn about the entrepreneurs’ personal and household situations, to learn about the kind of family and community support necessary to start new enterprises;
• We will ask directly about how the winning entrepreneurs spent their US$1,000 cash prizes – and about how the unsuccessful entrepreneurs anticipate that they would have spent such funds.

Can ‘seed funding’ help African ideas grow?

Little is known about the general characteristics of young African entrepreneurs. Photo: courtesy of suphakit73/ FreeDigitalPhotos.net
These questions will allow us to describe the entrepreneurs in careful detail – an important contribution to iiG research as we currently know remarkably little about either the general characteristics of young African entrepreneurs or about the kinds of informal support required to start new businesses.

The questions will also allow us to measure directly the effect of the US$1,000 seed funding. We will do this by comparing the outcomes of those entrepreneurs who won the competition with those entrepreneurs who nearly won (for example, we can compare the performance of the first-placed entrepreneurs with those who placed second, third and fourth). This will enable careful answers to many critical questions about the likely value of seed investment for new enterprises:

- Does seed funding help young entrepreneurs to start new businesses? If so, how large is the effect?
- Does seed funding help to improve the characteristics of new businesses? For example, are the winners’ enterprises more profitable? Do they employ more people?
- How does the grant change entrepreneurs’ household circumstances? For example, do entrepreneurs use such grants to move out of their parents’ house?
- How do ‘sharing norms’ affect entrepreneurs’ spending of the grant? Do entrepreneurs divert the investment to support household spending, rather than to develop their business?
- We asked all entrepreneurs before the competition how they planned to spend the prize money if successful; we can therefore compare this planned spending with the actual spending undertaken. Further, we can compare the way that successful entrepreneurs actually spent their money with the way that nearly-successful entrepreneurs believe that they would have spent their money. Both of these comparisons will provide insights into the ways that ‘behavioural’ constraints may limit enterprise investment, for example, through ‘time inconsistency’.

In short, this is an innovative project that involves an unusual sample of young entrepreneurs – entrepreneurs whose incentives, actions and outcomes are of particular interest to development policymakers around the world. The project will allow us to learn new lessons about the value of seed funding for encouraging the growth and expansion of new enterprises in Africa. We anticipate finishing data collection later this year, and will have preliminary results early in 2013. We look forward to discussing our findings with researchers and policymakers alike.

TO FIND OUT MORE

ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS

Simon Quinn is currently doing post-doctoral research in development economics at the CSAE and as an Examination Fellow at All Souls College. He is working primarily on issues of firms in developing economies.

Marcel Fafchamps is Professor of Economic Development in the Department of Economics and the Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. His current research focuses on social network effects and the diffusion of innovation, with an emphasis on firms in developing economies.
The electoral impact of conditional cash transfer programmes

Starting in Mexico in the late 1990s, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes have been implemented in an increasingly large number of countries in an attempt to reduce poverty. How these CCT programmes are implemented is different depending on the local context, but the basic idea is that poor households receive a cash grant (either from government or from a donor agency) as long as they meet certain conditions, such as keeping their children in school or regularly visiting health centres. There is a large body of evidence that such programmes improve household welfare.

Recent research by Julien Labonne, a DPhil student at the CSAE, tests whether a large-scale CCT programme implemented by the government in the Philippines had any impact on incumbent mayors’ performance in the 2010 municipal elections. Despite the current trend towards fiscal decentralization and the growing importance of local politicians, there is limited direct evidence of the local electoral impacts of CCT programmes. Although the programme was usually implemented in all villages in a municipality, in this case a subset of beneficiary municipalities was randomly selected to receive the programme in a randomly selected subset of villages.

Using precinct-level data, the research shows that in a competitive political environment, local incumbents benefit electorally from CCT programmes implemented in their own municipality: incumbent vote share is higher in the 2010 elections by about 26 percentage points. This is striking, because the incumbent was not able to influence whether their municipality was selected to participate or able to influence who received the cash grants. However, the programme had no impact in municipalities with low levels of political competition, possibly because the support for the incumbent was already very high. One alternative explanation would be that in non-competitive environments, incumbents have access to other means, legal or illegal, to win the elections.

Interestingly, within municipalities, there were no differences in incumbent vote share between villages that were part of the programme and villages that were not. This is consistent with the argument that incumbent mayors compensated households in control villages by redistributing their own budget.

The work goes on to highlight additional risks associated with strict targeting of development programmes based on poverty measures. While such targeting decreases the central government’s ability to favour politically important constituencies, it also strengthens the political advantage of the incumbent candidate. If poorer districts also have poorly performing local officials then any cash transfer initiative might have nefarious long-term consequences. Even if at first poverty targeting can be justified on equity grounds, it might be necessary to consider additional criteria reflecting the quality of local leadership after an initial round of programme implementation.

The research has implications for the design of, and the interpretation of results from, randomized experiments. It highlights the fact that the level at which randomized experiments are carried out can greatly affect the results and that individuals in the control group can indirectly benefit from treatment even when it is allocated at a fairly aggregated level. Results presented in this research are consistent with the view that, for some outcomes, local officials have incentives to re-allocate their budget towards non-beneficiaries. As such, it might be preferable, even if more expensive, to carry out the randomization at the level of the electoral district.

To find out more

About the researcher

Julien Labonne is a DPhil candidate at the CSAE. His work focuses on political economy and policy evaluation in the Philippines.

About the research

The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers: Evidence from a field experiment, CSAE working paper WPS/2012-09

http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/csae-wps-2012-09.pdf
Armed conflict and economic performance in Rwanda

WHILE THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT CAN BE DEVASTATING, THE EFFECT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON A COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE MEDIUM AND LONG TERM REMAINS UNCLEAR. FROM AN ECONOMIC THEORY PERSPECTIVE THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. SOME THEORIES PREDICT THAT AN ECONOMY WILL RECOVER RELATIVELY QUICKLY, WHILE OTHERS SUGGEST THAT CATCHING UP MAY TAKE A LONG TIME, FOR INSTANCE BECAUSE HUMAN CAPITAL RECOVERS ONLY SLOWLY, OR THAT COUNTRIES CAN BE TRAPPED IN A SITUATION WHERE CONFLICT AND POOR PERFORMANCE COEXIST.

Current evidence, relying on cross-country data, provides support for either of these views. Some studies find evidence for relatively rapid recovery, while others indicate that countries may be stuck in a low performing economy for some time. One possible explanation for these apparent contradictory results lies in the nature of the data that is used, and the fact that a number of factors that may affect the relationship between conflict and economic performance remain unobserved.

The speed of economic recovery may depend on the type of damage caused by the conflict: for instance whether it destroyed primarily physical capital or human capital. The identity of the parties in the conflict may also matter: in particular whether the conflict was between states, often relying on professional armies; or within a state between fractions of society, some of them non-army forces. While any of these factors may play a role, each of them remains typically unobserved in cross-country data, making estimates fragile and complicating identification of a causal relationship.

This project is part of a wider programme that aims at improving our understanding of conflict and economic performance at the micro level. Using community and household level data from Rwanda, research focuses on the impact of different forms of violence on economic performance within one single country six years after conflict. Exploiting the sadly unique environment of Rwanda, which experienced distinct forms of violence during the same period, the study compares the effect of genocide, which mostly destroyed human capital, and civil war, which typically affected physical capital.

Three key findings emerge from this research. Firstly, comparing high and low conflict intensity areas the research finds that households and communities that experienced more conflict in 1994 have lower consumption rates six years after the end of the violence. Secondly, further analysis suggests that the economy is still in transition, with the returns to land and labour significantly different between zones that experienced low and high intensity conflict, consistent with ongoing recovery. Thirdly, the results also provide evidence that these returns, and by implication the process of recovery, depend on the form of violence. Returns to land are lower, and returns to unskilled labour are higher for genocide affected areas - a direct consequence of the decrease in labour force as the genocide targeted adult males in particular. Returns to skilled labour are also higher in genocide affected areas, because the genocide targeted the highly educated. They are lower in civil war areas, most likely because civil war damages factors that augment skilled labour, for instance transport infrastructure.

TO FIND OUT MORE

ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS

Pieter Serneels is a Research Associate at CSAE and Reader in Economics at the University of East Anglia. He was an Academic Visitor at the CSAE during the spring and summer terms of 2012.

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ABOUT THE RESEARCH

The impact of armed conflict on economic performance: Evidence from Rwanda, CSAE working paper WPS/2012-10
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/csaewps-2012-10.pdf

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AUTUMN 2012
DOES AFRICA NEED MORE macroeconomics and fewer programme evaluations? That was the sub-text running through a recent CSAE workshop I attended on ‘Firms and Labour Markets in Africa’. Flip through a leading development economics journal and you’re likely to find clever evaluations (randomized or otherwise) of microfinance in Malawi and NGO ‘livelihoods’ programmes in Uganda, but very little discussion of either country’s inflation rate or export performance.

Rich countries have business cycles and macroeconomies; poor countries have microeconomies and projects to evaluate?

The backlash against RCTs and impact evaluations in development economics is old news (which is not to say good news, necessarily). So why aren’t more people out there doing good macroeconomic work on African economies? One answer is that, by and large, macroeconomic data from many countries in sub-Saharan Africa is very unreliable.

The solution, I want to argue, is that statistics offices should look a bit more like central banks. Not only do they need more resources to provide reliable macro data, but they need the kind of strict firewall of institutional independence that protects many central banks from inflationary spirals.

**An example: Tanzania’s growth mystery**

Tanzania is a case in point. The country has been celebrated as an African economic success story, based largely on its official economic growth rate of 5.7% in real GDP from 1996 to 2008 - see for example Steve Radelet’s 2010 book, *Emerging Africa*. But over this same period, the proportion of Tanzanian households living below the national poverty line fell only modestly, from 37% to 33%,
while the Gini index of inequality rose slightly from 34.6 to 37.6.

This is not just an issue of economic growth failing to trickle down to the poor. Growth without poverty reduction is sad. Growth without poverty reduction OR a significant increase in inequality is close to an arithmetic impossibility. Something is awry with the macro data.

Tanzania is not alone. Jerven (2011) documents the record of questionable historical revisions to GDP series in several African countries. From a more cosmic perspective, Henderson et al (2012) use NASA satellite data to expose large discrepancies between national accounts data and the evolution of ‘night lights’ in many countries with weak statistical systems. So while Tanzania’s experience has unique ingredients, there are broader lessons to be drawn here.

A tale of two price series

A likely resolution of Tanzania’s growth mystery, rarely uttered in public, is that the growth figures are overstated. For one, the price index used to deflate GDP has seriously underestimated inflation.

[It’s important to note that the issues I point out here apply to the consumer price index (CPI) series before the 2010 revision, which responded to many of these concerns. The historical experience remains instructive.]

The problem with Tanzania’s price data became apparent when comparing the official consumer price index with an alternative index of prices from household survey data that the National Bureau of Statistics collects to measure poverty rates. From a base year of 2000, the official series rose by roughly 80% by 2009, while the household survey index rose by roughly 170%. In short, independent data collected by the same government agency suggests the CPI might was seriously understating the inflation rate during the 2000s.

Note that the CPI is used to deflate the consumption component of the nominal GDP figures. So understating inflation by such a big margin means overstating real GDP growth.

Atkinson and Lugo (2011) explore the enormous discrepancy between real consumption growth in the national accounts and the household surveys. They note that part of this gap may be driven by the surveys’ failure to capture growth at the extreme upper tail of the income distribution – implying the true Gini has risen more than we realize. But they also note that there is likely still a big mystery to be explained, and the CPI is probably a part of the answer.

There are hypothetically valid reasons the official CPI could diverge from the household survey data – for instance, differences in how prices are weighted in the consumption basket. But these differences in weights don’t explain the gap. (See box 2 of the NPS report, or for a deeper dive on Tanzanian inflation, see Adam et al 2012). Instead, all signs suggest the differences stem not from different
data sources or different weights, but from something that happened during the compilation of the official CPI.

**Two birds, one stone: Invest in statistical independence**

That leaves two plausible explanations: a lack of technical capacity, or an excess of political interference.

If the problem is political interference, this points to the need for greater political independence of the statistical agency. In Tanzania, as in much of the region, the statistics bureau is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, and dependent on it for its budget and staff salaries. If the Minister of Finance doesn’t like the inflation numbers, you’re inclined to listen.

But what if the problem is technical capacity, not political interference? The answer is arguably the same. Tanzania’s statistics bureau, again like much but not all countries in the region, is tied to the civil service salary scale. During my own time working in Tanzania, my government colleagues earned per month what external consultants earned in a day - and they could increase their take-home pay by several-fold by chasing per diems through attending workshops, trainings, and doing survey fieldwork.

Ending the cycle of chasing per diems and rationalizing the reimbursement system means breaking free from civil service regulations - something that’s been proposed by donors, but never advanced. There are a number of sticking points, but one big obstacle is that donors are not ready to pay for salaries in a truly independent agency. The fact that donors routinely spend millions for micro-oriented survey fieldwork and one-off impact evaluations raises questions about priorities.

Africa needs more macroeconomics. Good microeconometric studies and programme evaluations are vitally important, but no substitute for reliable national statistics. Remedying the current micro-macro imbalance requires renewed focus on the institution tasked with producing macro data: Africa’s unglamorous and underfunded central statistics offices.

For the time being, international demand for better macroeconomic statistics is partially blunted by the IMF’s practice of creating its own, parallel set of in-house macroeconomic data. If donors like the IMF were forced to rely on the same public information that the Tanzanian public receives, pressure to invest more in the National Bureau of Statistics might gain traction.

**TO FIND OUT MORE**

**ABOUT THE RESEARCHER**

Justin Sandefur is a research fellow at the Center for Global Development (CGD), Washington DC, and a Research Associate at the CSAE.

**ABOUT THE RESEARCH**

A version of this item also appears on CGD’s ‘Views from the Center’ blog.

CSAE 2013

call for papers

CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
St Catherine’s College, Oxford.
17-19 March 2013

Keynote speaker
Edward Miguel, Director of the Center for Effective Global Action at the University of California, Berkeley.

Dinner speaker

Papers addressing economic analysis of the broad issues relevant for economic development in Africa are invited for the CSAE 2013 conference. Papers on countries other than those in Africa are welcome, providing they deal with issues central to African development.

Abstracts
All abstracts for consideration must be submitted via the online submission site at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/

Student applications
PhD/DPhil students must submit a full paper for consideration.

Funding
There is a limited budget to fund African presenters who are currently living and working in Africa and who will be travelling from Africa to the conference. Funding will cover all participation and travel costs for successful applicants. Applicants must submit a full paper for consideration.

Detailed submission instructions can be found online at: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/

Deadline for submissions
Friday 30 November 2012 midnight

Enquiries
Enquiries should include the reference ‘CSAE conference 2013’ and be addressed to:
Email: csae.conference@economics.ox.ac.uk
Fax: +44 (0)1865 281447
Postal address: CSAE, Dept of Economics, Oxford University, Manor Road Building, Manor Rd, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, UK
CSAE: Building the future

FOR MANY YEARS CSAE HAS BEEN lead by the trio of Paul Collier as Director, and Francis Teal and Marcel Fafchamps as Deputy Directors. The time has come to renew this leadership for the next generation.

In September, Francis Teal retired, the successful tenure of his position being demonstrated by the research-packed workshop that was held in celebration of his contributions. Paul Collier has taken up a Chair at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford’s recently created public policy school. His new position is compatible with his continued Directorship of CSAE, and his move is being used as an opportunity to create a new Statutory Chair which will be tied to the CSAE Directorship, thereby ensuring CSAE’s long-term future. We expect that the University will soon be able to advertise this new Chair, which will be recruited in open international competition.

Meanwhile, Professor Marcel Fafchamps will join Paul as CSAE co-Director. Dr James Fenske, who is already very active in CSAE, running the 2013 conference and as one of the managing editors of the Journal of African Economies, will replace Marcel as Deputy Director. We are in the process of finalising the appointment of CSAE Deputy Director to replace Francis Teal and expect to announce the appointment shortly.

Working Papers

Available at: www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/wps-list.html

- Interpersonal influence regarding the decision to vote within Mozambican households by Ana Silvia de Matos Vaz. WPS/2012-14
- China as a developmental state by John Knight. WPS/2012-13.
- Growth of African economies: Productivity, policy syndromes and the importance of institutions by Augustin Kwasi Fosu. WPS/2012-11
- The impact of armed conflict on economic performance: Evidence from Rwanda by Pieter Serneels and Marijke Verpoorten. WPS/2012-10
- The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers: Evidence from a field experiment by Julien Labonne. WPS/2012-09
- Was the Middle East’s economic descent a legal or political failure? Debating the Islamic Law Matters Thesis by Adeel Malik. WPS/2012-08
- Exchange rate arrangements in the transition to East African Monetary Union by Christopher S. Adam, Pantaleo Kessy, Camillus Kombe, and Stephen A O’Connell. WPS/2012-07
- Greening Africa? Technologies, endowments and the latecomer effect by Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables. WPS/2012-06

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The Centre for the Study of African Economies carries out economic research with a particular focus on Africa. Its aim is to improve economic and social conditions in the poorest societies.

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