

"Rebuilding Democracy after the End of the Cold War:
The Effects of Majority State Ownership on
Subsequent Democratization in
Sub-Saharan
Africa"

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Many analysts hold that Africa finally began to liberalize politically with the arrival of its “second liberation” or the “third wave” (Diamond 1996, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Clapham 1997, Joseph 1999, 1998, Young 1999, van de Walle 2002, Quinn 2003, Gyimah-Boadi 2004). The arrival of the African wave of political liberalization was coincident with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Beginning with the National Conference in Benin in 1989, which paralleled the French national assembly of 1789 as well as including traditional aspects of African political life, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant political liberalization. Between 1989 and 1991, over 21 countries changed constitutions and political practices to allow greater participation within their countries. During the whole decade of the 1990s, 42 of 48 countries have held multiparty legislative elections, though not all could be deemed free and fair (van de Walle 2002). Moreover, more than 70 presidential elections were held where at least 2 candidates ran. For example, only ten of these elections resulted in a change in head of government: Zambia, Togo, and Senegal are examples.

Now fifteen years later and halfway through the first decade of the 2000s, nearly every African country has now held multiparty elections in one form or another, and African freedoms seem to be on the rise (van de Walle 2002).¹ Nonetheless, in the 2006 Freedom House ratings, 14 sub-Saharan African countries were still considered to be “not free.” Also, 23 were listed as “partly free,” and only 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were deemed to be “free.” As such, the third wave was not evenly dispersed through the region.

That a wave of liberalization swept through the region cannot be in dispute. Compared to just over decades ago, in 1975, 25 countries were considered not free, 16

were considered to be partly free, and three were free. So two decades later 13 fewer countries were “not free” and 7 more were “partly free,” and eight more were considered to be “free.” Moreover, combining all of the free countries with some of the partially free countries into a category Freedom House lists as “electoral democracy”, we find that 22 of the region’s countries are so called. However, this means that 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain outside the categorization of electoral democracies.² A sample of nearly all sub-Saharan African countries shows that the average level of political and civil freedoms from 1975 to 1985 was 5.6 which freedom House would list as not free.³ By contrast, the same sample from 1995 to 2005 was 4.48, which would be considered partly free. Nonetheless, nearly all countries in sub-Saharan Africa enjoy more political and civil rights than they did twenty years ago, though the average score is still only partly free.

This paper explores the recent movements towards political liberalizations in the light of some observations made by Carothers (2002) vis-à-vis transitions to democracy. He characterizes the literature (see below) as suggesting that structural factors – or the political and economic legacies of the region – really have had no predictive power in determining which countries will have likely had the most increases in political and civil rights. Unlike past research which emphasized the process of the transitions,⁴ this paper only test legacy variables from the period of 1975-85 to gauge their impacts upon levels of political and civil rights in the 1995-2005 period.

Democracy and its Sources

The most common explanations for the region wide increase of freedoms in sub-Saharan Africa include some combination of external and internal influences, though

emphasis varies. The external influences often described are these: the extension of the “third wave” to Africa, the increased legitimacy of democracy associated with the end of the Cold War, the lack of a champion for socialism with the fall of the Soviet Union, Western Official Development Assistance (ODA) being linked to political reforms, previous economic conditionality imposed upon faltering African economies, or the demonstration effect showing the fragility of authoritarianism in the wake of its collapse in Eastern Europe (Huntington 1990, Ottaway 1997, Clapham 1997, Lancaster 2000, Harbeson 2000, Joseph 1998, 1999, Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993). Even relatively mercantilist France required that African recipients of French bilateral aid have economic agreements with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Balladur (Cumming 2001, 237; Fuchs 1995, 48; Quinn and Simon 2003). So a combination of more legitimacy for democracy, the delegitimization of a socialist alternative, the linking of bilateral aid to political liberalization, and the demonstration effect of authoritarian collapse support the idea that part of the transition was externally induced or influenced.⁵

The “normal” domestic forces militating in favor of democracy or democratization, as outlined by modernization theory, seems to be mostly missing from sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ The region is not known for high levels of literacy, per capita incomes, a rising middle class or a strong civil society, a rising class of business owners, or most of the other variables associated with endogenous democratic theory (Bates 1994, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Quinn 2003, Gyimah-Boadi 2004).⁷ Since these are normally the “prerequisites of democracy,” traditional modernization theory cannot predict much by way of democracy or democratization in the region (Lipset 1959).

Africanists, more often, point in the opposite direction for domestic sources of support for democracy: democracy is more likely to emerge, not from economic development and success, but from the collapse of patronage systems supporting previous regimes (Bates 1994, Grosh 1994, van de Walle 1994, Lewis 1996, Quinn 2002). In fact, authoritarianism is considered to be quite durable at lower levels of income (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). For some, the ensuing protests from long-term economic decline, or austerity-measure induced liberalization programs, or in light of a domestic lack of legitimacy of incumbent regimes themselves allowed for a democratic opening (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Lewis 1996). However of those regimes that were democratic from independence onwards (the Gambia, Botswana, and Mauritius), British legacy or their small size is often attributed to their past success (Diamond 1988, Barro 1999).⁸

Transitions to Democracy

Much of the literature seeking to explain Africa's increase in political and economic rights falls within the category of the transitions to democracy literature (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1991, also Anderson 1999). Beginning with concepts developed to explain the re-emergence of democracy in Latin American, then refined to the case of Eastern Europe, these ideas were then applied to the region of sub-Saharan Africa.⁹ Much of this literature is necessarily qualitative and descriptive in content. The transition literature tends to follow descriptively the events leading up to a regime's decision to hold elections, the decision to hold a national conference, the staging of a coup, or some other crisis which led to the democratic opening. It often uses a path dependent, contingent approach. According to Bratton and van de Walle, what separates

previous regime transitions from the Africa ones is that it is not about elite pacts or fissures among the elites that initiate transitions, rather it is protest (1997).

The “transitions to democracy” literature discusses more the collapse of authoritarianism and the movement towards political liberalization than any preconditions for democracy as such. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) hold that, in Latin America, regional structural variables do not predict democratic outcomes as well as does the particular path the transition takes. The outcomes are determined by alliances, luck, personal actions, pact creation, negotiations, and overall political agency in the middle of a transition. According to a critic of the transitions literature, the approach shares five common themes (Carothers 2002). The first approach addresses the underlying *teleos* of transitions: that one is moving away from dictatorial rule and towards democracy. Second, the democratization process unfolds in a set sequence of states.¹⁰ Third, the elections are of crucial importance to transitions. Fourth, that “underlying conditions in transitional countries – their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, sociocultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features – will not be major factors in either the onset of the outcomes of the transition process” (8). Fifth, that the states in which these transitions are taking place are “coherent, functioning states” (8).

Also, given that so many of the countries that have liberalized in sub-Saharan Africa have not consolidated into “democracies,” the paradigm itself may be called into question (Ibid). These regimes that have held elections, but have not achieved full democratic status have been called: “semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy,

illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy” (Carothers 2002, 10; van de Walle 2002; Joseph 1998).¹¹

However, in perhaps one of the seminar works on transitions to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) do find several variables which predicted democratization or political liberalization with statistical significance: national conferences, number of elections post independence, military intervention, frequency of political protests, overseas development aid, opposition cohesion, and percentage of legislative seats held by the majority in the last election before 1990. However, most of these variables are part of the process of the transition as opposed to long standing political, social, or economic legacies of the region.

LEGACY VARIABLES

In light of Carother’s (2002) view, from the transition literature, that legacy variables do not have any explanatory power, this paper will test this idea empirically. Many scholars have used legacy variables to predict future performance of institutions in other settings. These legacies can be political legacies, such the colonial past, levels of participation or competition during prior periods, or past levels of political and civil rights. They can be economic variables, such as natural resource endowments of oil or mining, economic growth, or levels of income. They can be social, such a levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization or levels of urbanization. Finally, they can be political economy legacies, such as type of ownership of industry.

-Type of colonial past

Many have argued that countries in sub-Saharan Africa that were under British rule were more likely to maintain democratic polities (Barro 1999, Diamond 1988). For

example, most West African Francophone countries were de facto one-party states when they achieved independence, though they soon enshrined these monopolies into law; and though most Anglophone countries also had super-majorities in the legislatures, their one-party status often emerged through the banning of the remaining minority parties (Zolberg 1966; Collier 1982). Moreover, the former French systems were more likely to have one-party rule early in the independence period without direct coercion (Collier 1982, Zolberg 1966). Also, Widner (1994) suggests that being Anglophone or Francophone was a proxy for such variables as distribution of rents, organization of parallel organizations, single list voting versus candidate centered voting, and central control over the media (51).

Some have suggested that French heritage was more likely to lead to a national conference for transitions, which in turn could affect levels of political and civil rights later. Some also have argued that Portuguese colonization repression of liberation movements led to a radicalization of politics. More often, a British legacy has been linked with democracy, good governance, or lower levels of corruption (Barro 1999, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, La Porta et al. 1999, and Treisman 2000).

-Level of Participation and Mobilization

Recently Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) examined the impact of previous regime type on democratic transitions in African states. Their principal argument is that democratic transitions have not occurred free from the restrictions imposed by the previous regime, but rather that "contemporary political changes are conditioned by mechanisms embedded in the ancien regime." Bratton and van de Walle distinguish between different kinds of authoritarian regimes based upon the extent of

participation (P) and competition (C). Using these criteria, van De Walle and Bratton distinguish four types of neopatrimonial regimes in Africa: Personal Dictatorship (low P and C), Military Oligarchy (low P, medium C), Plebiscitary One-Party System (high P, low C) and Competitive One-Party System (high P, med C). The authors conclude that regime types with a tradition of political competition (e.g., competitive one-party system) have the best chance of making a successful transition to democracy, as they need only to broaden the scope of competition and participation.¹²

In Eastern Europe, some scholars suggest that lower levels of competition in the prior regime meant that the former parties would more likely gain ground given the lack of political experience of prior parties. In fact, Kitschelt (1995, 455) suggests that the legacy of the previous regime also affected the type of political parties that would emerge. When prior regimes were more repressive and less open, the former dominant parties were able to gain control more effectively. Given the lack of turn over, many would rate these regimes with lower political and civil rights. In fact, Ishiyama and Quinn (2006) found that sub-Saharan Africa countries which had featured competitive one party regimes were more likely to have seats in the legislature go to the former dominant party. However, this is a legacy variable that has been shown to matter, though not directly for levels of political and civil rights.

-Modernization variables

Given the view that democracy flows from modernizing societies, some variables will be included as proxies for modernization: per capita GDP and levels of urbanization. As discussed above, the variable normally associated with democracy are such things as high levels of literacy, per capita incomes, a rising middle class, a rising class of business

owners, or most of the other variables associated with endogenous democratic theory (Lipset 1959, Bates 1994, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Barro 1999, Quinn 2003). One could argue that majority state ownership also served as a proxy for a lack of an industrial bourgeois class since countries had to have a majority share of most industries to be coded as such.

-Traditional Bureaucratic Lag Legacies

One of the best predictors of present levels of political and civil rights should be past levels of political and civil rights. Although many countries have transitioned towards more freedoms, according to most modernization or neo-modernization theories, most movement is towards more freedoms and not less. The general assumption, especially in the transition literature, is that countries move generally upward from authoritarian polities to democratic ones, and they move in stages of liberalization, at least historically. Much of the recent discussion of African democratization is contextualized in the discussion of the third wave, which is a form of neo-modernization which imparts the *teleos* of democracy as one of the emerging realities of development.

Although Huntington discusses reverse waves, few have suggested that this has been taken place in Africa. In fact, Diamond (1996) has suggested that the advanced countries should try to consolidate the gains made so far to keep a reverse from taking place. Therefore, all things being equal we should expect, on average, free countries to stay free, for partly free countries to be partly free or freer, and that previously not-free countries should mostly move to the partly free category, though some might be launched into free occasionally. One complication to this analysis, however, is that the countries with the most possibility to liberalize are not free countries.

Nonetheless, when one examines the “traditional causes of democratization – a rising middle class, greater wealth and prosperity, rising expectations, more business, more civil society, we should expect a slow rise of such things, and they should be linked to economic, social and cultural change. Those countries with more of the ingredients in 1975-85 should also have more of these same ingredients in 1995-05, especially in the third world.

-Number of Elections

Bratton and van de Walle suggest that the number of elections held during the independence period could also be a proxy for participation and experience with voting. In fact, they found this variable to be statistically linked with liberalization. This variable will be watched for interactions with colonial heritage, as some use colonial heritage as a proxy for levels of participation (Widner 1994). It also could be considered a democratic institution which needs to develop over time.

-Ethnic or Linguistic Divisions

Many people hold that the poor growth and political difficulties of sub-Saharan Africa emanate from ethnic or linguistic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997). In fact, they attribute “poor economic policies, poor education, political instability, inadequate infrastructure, and weak institutions” [in Africa] to ethnolinguistic fractionalization (p. 2). They found this variable to be negatively and significantly linked to lower growth cross regionally. Giving credence to this argument, ethnolinguistic fractionalization was found to be positively and significantly linked to corruption by La Porta et al. (1999). However, this variable was not shown to be linked to growth or policy by Englebert (2000) or Quinn (2002).

-Mineral Resource curse

Many recent thinkers have illustrated that countries rich in natural resources tend to be less democratic (Ross 2001, 2004; Jensen and Wantchekon 1999). The arguments hold that when state elites do not have to tax business leaders, then business leaders are less likely to push for political liberalization and historically they have been one of the primary driving forces for democratization. Quinn (1999 1993) has made similar arguments for majority state ownership of industry or mining and oil. Therefore, the expectations will be that countries with oil or mineral exporting sectors will be less democratic than other similar countries, *ceteris paribus*.

New Legacy Variable: Majority State Ownership of Industry

Quinn (2002, 1999, 1993) has argued that from 1966 – 1986 sub-Saharan African countries which featured majority state ownership of most of their capital intensive industries or their largest mineral/ fuel export sector had two related outcomes: 1) they featured more inward oriented development policies than other similar countries;¹³ and 2) they were less likely to have multiparty party regimes than other similar countries.¹⁴

These legacies should impact the trajectory of sub-Saharan African countries and their political liberalization in several ways: first, more of these countries were less democratic, on average, than other similar Africa countries (Quinn 2000, 1999, 1993). Second they had more inward-oriented policies than other similar countries (Quinn 2002, 1999, 1993). Third, since the industries that the political elites came to own / control were capital intensive, and countries cannot usually export from sectors that use scarce factors (Heckshire-Ohlin theorem), these state owned industries never became a source of major export earnings.¹⁵ This is beyond any traditional explanations for inefficient state

owned industries that are more wasteful and are sources for patronage (Tangri 1999, World Bank 1989, Bates 1981, van de Walle 2001, Quinn 2002, Sandbrook 1993). Fourth, if these countries did not have mineral resources to export, they would have undermined their traditional export sector, agriculture, without replacing it as the primary source of earning hard currency.

Why would countries with majority state ownership first have more inward-oriented policies? Quinn offers both theoretical and empirical evidence for this view. Theoretically, this outcome is predicated upon the combination of an endogenous tariff theory approach combined with an analysis of which factors are scarce or abundant, and then predicting sector preference based upon factor abundance (Rogowski 1989; Frieden 1991). Since capital is scarce in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the owners of the sectors which use capital intensively should prefer protectionist policies to free trade policies, following the logic of a Stolper-Samuelson model (Rogowski, 1989). Within the endogenous tariff literature, the state is usually seen as acting as a neutral arbiter vis-à-vis this policy. However, it is logical that when the government itself becomes the owners of scarce factors, they take on protectionist policy preference that private owner would have (Quinn 2002, 1999). Quinn argues that the political elites in sub-Saharan African countries between 1966 and 1986 obtain their policy preferences readily given their ability to overcome very limited collective action costs, their ability to economically co-opt potential allies, or their ability to repress opponents – especially in the authoritarian polities so common to the region during this period. They also had much more autonomy vis-à-vis the international community to set domestic economic policies or to follow authoritarian tendencies. Therefore the political elite came to own sectors

from which private ownership would have pursued protectionist policies. The political elite could protect them, or subsidize them or both. They tended to do both (Quinn 2002, Bates 1981).

Beyond using a comparative advantage argument to prove that capital-scarce industries could not be competitive internationally, the relative economic inefficiency of state-owned industries is also predicted from standard analysis of Africa politics whereby the state uses all resources at its disposal to redistribute patronage to its followers, which is necessarily economically inefficient, though quite political efficient (e.g., Bates 1981, Lewis 1996, van de Walle 2001, World Bank 1989, Tangri 1999, Quinn 1999, 2002). By becoming owners, the political elite ran the industries for political reasons often at the expense of the long-term interests of their sectors. According to Shafer, state ownership eliminates the political insulation which allows privately owned companies more shelter from political demands (1983, 96). Thus they took on the protectionist preferences of their sectors, but not the long-term views that private owners might have as political elites were maximizing political power, not economic returns.

Empirically Quinn shows in cross-national comparisons as well as case studies that countries with majority state ownership of either most industries or the largest export sector did experience the following: higher levels of currency overvaluation, higher levels of inflation, higher levels of debt, higher levels of agricultural taxation, more jobs in the state sector, as well as lower per capita levels of investment and lower per capita levels of merchandise exports (2002, 39). For example, Quinn shows that the levels of currency overvaluation for countries with majority state ownership was an average of 210.6%, compared to 37.8% for others (2002, 39).¹⁶ These countries also had declining volumes

of agricultural exports as one might expect (Quinn, 2002: 74, 93, 111, 128).

Additionally, using a two-stage least squares approach, he shows that the policies that were found to be positively associated with majority state ownership were shown to be negatively linked with per capita incomes. Moreover, those policies shown to be negatively linked with majority state ownership were positively correlated with higher per capita incomes in the region (2002, 149). Thus, all things being equal, these countries would have lower levels of per capita incomes.

However, with the change to economic conditionality in the mid-1980s (Sachs 1989), and its enforcement in the post Cold War period (van de Walle 2001), and the linking of ODA to political liberalization in the 1990s (Cunning 2001, Lancaster 2000), all coincident with the continued economic decline of most Africa countries, and especially the ones with majority state ownership of industry, the economic crisis eliminated the sources of patronage that was the glue of the political system.

Many scholars of Africa see the primary means of rule as neopatrimonial where “the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or rule of law” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994, 458). Whether or not all scholars use the term neopatrimonial, patrimonial, patronage systems, or rent seeking, many scholars see patronage as the glue of the African political system following independence (Bates 1994, Englebert 2000, Joseph 1999, Tangri 1999, Quinn 2002, Young 1999, van de Walle 1999, Clapham 1997, Callaghy 1984, Sandbrook 1993)

As such, the countries most unable to continue for pay their patronage systems from domestic sources were the ones most likely to have to bargain with both their domestic opposition and international actors (Lewis 1996, Bratton and van de Walle

1997). As so many scholars have pointed out Africa has been in economic crisis since the mid-1980s if not before (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993, Ravenhill 1986, Sachs 1986).

With pervasive inward-oriented policies, many economies in the region lost their vibrant agricultural exporting sector and emphasized state sponsored industrialization to provide for more development (Bates 1981). However, with no comparative advantage for sub-Saharan Africa, these industries did not tend to emerge out of the “infant industry” period to export (Quinn 2002, 1999). As such, the traditional export sectors declined but no industrial sector took its place. Therefore, the countries with majority state ownership of industry which resulted in the loss of exporting sectors were the ones most likely to have to fully face a political crisis. Both domestic and external sources of funding were set against the inward-oriented development path and authoritarian politics from 1989 onwards.

Countries with lucrative mineral or oil sectors were less constrained by the international community as they still have control over very valuable rent streams and are unlikely to democratize.¹⁷ Although these countries would face what some call the mineral resource curse (with or without majority state ownership), and they too would lose their agricultural export sector, they would not lose their access to hard currency and funding for patronage – unless the mineral or oil sector went bust.¹⁸ Therefore, the political elite would always have some cash flow from the sale of mineral exports, though their prices varied significantly over time. Should the sector begin to lose money, then they would more resemble the countries with majority state ownership of industry – the associated inward-oriented policies would have driven out other sectors (far beyond the Dutch disease level) without an exporting alternative. The states which found oil in the

post-Cold war period are expected to be more like countries with oil in the first period. They would have a source of revenue and investment not linked to economic or political conditionality.¹⁹

Those countries which had relatively more outward politics should have been able to maintain more of their traditional export sectors and should have been better able to maintain the cash flow to supported patronage systems. For example, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Botswana were able to increase volumes of agriculture exports during this period (Quinn 2002, World Bank 1989). Although most countries faced crises with the debt crisis and patronage politics were still in some economic trouble, the complete collapse of sources of patronage was uneven in the region. Those that did not have either an active agricultural exporting base or either mineral or oil resources to replace them lost their minimum ability to maintain patronage systems.²⁰ Those that kept their export sectors might follow the more traditional modernization paradigm.

Therefore, with the collapse of export earnings from agriculture, the rising demands associated with debt, the world-wide delegitimization of a state-owned and state led development policy, the loss of socialist champions, the emergence of a consensus around neo-liberal policies, as well as the pervasive economic decline of state dominated systems in Africa, the logic has now reversed – those countries had featured majority state ownership of industry were the most likely to collapse economically, and then politically. This created an opening for democracy (or state collapse). However, this would not necessarily follow for those with majority state ownership of lucrative mineral exporting sectors – they should resemble the Cold War African states, aside from the shift of international ideology.

Other Africanists have made similar arguments, though their ideas tended to be generalized to the region as a whole and do not distinguish according to the structural variable of majority state ownership. That is they hold that democracy is more likely to emerge out of the ashes of a collapsed patronage systems (Bates 1994, Grosh 1994, van de Walle 1994, Lewis 1996). Grosh (1994) also suggests a similar argument to this one, though not couched in these terms. She holds that there are two types of countries: ones “that used repressed economy policies long enough to cause their economies to collapse and those that used the policies less severely and whose economies growth slowly but positively” (43). However, she does not show which countries which will be in which groups in an *a priori* fashion. Using a decision model, Quinn (2002) predicts that one of the variables most likely to lead to change in countries with majority state ownership is economic collapse.²¹ The other best predictor was that countries that did not feature majority state ownership of either most industries of the largest export sectors (176-177).

Testing Legacy Variables

We include several models as competing models suggest themselves. We include several types of variables. First, we include variables pertaining to colonial heritage, whether British, Belgian, or Portuguese.²² No dummy variable for Italian or Spanish are included as they each only represented on country and all latter potential uniqueness of these countries would be attributed to type of colonization, and France is the default. Similarly, Ethiopia and Liberia are clustered with the default intercept. Second, we have legacy of levels of participation and competition in the older body politics. As such we include whether a country was a competitive one party system, a plebiscitary system, or a

multiparty system.²³ We exclude white settles as both Namibia and South Africa are excluded from this analysis.²⁴

Third, we have economic performance variables, such as measures of per capita GDP in 1985 and measures of growth from 1975 to 1985.²⁵ Fourth, we have a variable which measures potential ethnic conflict: ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Fifth, we have measures for countries which are primary exporters of oil or mining, as they should suffer from “the mineral curse” which has been linked to lower levels of democratization.²⁶ We also have a variable for countries which obtained oil resources in the post Cold War period. Sixth, and finally, we include a dummy variable for countries which featured majority state ownership of industry – but which did not have a mineral exporting sector.

Operationalization

Data from each variable type comes from a variety of sources. The dependent variable is measured in two ways. First, we include the averaged levels of political and civil rights from 1995 to 2005. They were summed and divided by the number of years and then by two, so the numbers run from 1 (the most political and civil freedoms) to 7 (the least number of political and civil freedoms). Then, the dependent variable is set at the difference (Diff Dem) of this variable from the average levels of political and civil rights from 1975 to 1985.²⁷ Then each number was subtracted from 8 to reverse the rank order and make higher scores reflect more political and civil rights.

The sources for each variable are as follows: The dependent variable comes from Freedom House where the dependent variable is the average of political and civil right from 1995 to 2005. They have been inverted and run 1 through 7 where 7 is the highest level of political and civil rights, and 1 the lowest.²⁸ This is also the source for the first

independent variable, the average levels of political and civil rights from 1975 to 1985. Particular colonial legacy are dummy variables for British, Belgian, and Portuguese heritage. This variable is comprised from personal knowledge as well as a check with Bratton and van de Walle's data set.²⁹ The independent variable, majority state ownership of industry was taken from Quinn (2004, 2002, 1999) as well as various other sources.³⁰ The variables for regime type (i.e., plebiscitary, competitive one party, military) come from Bratton and van de Walle's data set.³¹ These were the number of years that a country was coded in each regime type. So, too does the variable for level of urbanization and number of elections. The level of 1985 GDP per capita comes from Penn World Tables.³² The growth variable is average percent change in deflated per capita GDP and also comes from Penn World Tables.³³ New oil is included since it would create a ready source of new patronage and would make such regimes less vulnerable to international or domestic pressure.³⁴ Ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure is the 1986 one.³⁵

Therefore, the independent variables are these: the political and civil rights form 1975 to 85 (polciv75), majority state ownership without minerals or mining (MSOWOM),³⁶ plebiscitary regimes (pleb), competitive one party regimes (comp), Military regimes, per capita GDP from 1985 (pdppc85), GDP growth 1975 – 85 (growth 75-85), urbanization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, mining or oil exporting,³⁷ and former colonial status: British, Portuguese (Portug), and Belgian.³⁸ The number of elections was excluded as it was collinear with other variables.³⁹

The Model

In order to test the effects of legacy variable during the Cold War period upon levels of political and civil rights following a transition period, we will test the average levels of political and civil rights from the period of 1975 to 1985 and their relations to these same averages from 1995 to 2005. This gives us ten years before and after Africa's transition period.⁴⁰ Bratton and van de Walle's date the transition period from 1988 to 1994. This is safely before and after their periodization. We also include all of the countries from Bratton and van de Walle's sample of variables of 47 countries, though we exclude South Africa and Namibia as unique experiences during the period.⁴¹

Thus we will examine the recent movement of increased political and civil rights as a movement in that direction and not as a transition per se.⁴² We will examine both legacy variables as well as some from the transition period to see if they predict changes in levels of political and civil rights.

Model 1 one includes all of the variables with the levels of political and civil rights from 1995-05. Model 2 changes measures the absolute differences from 1995-05 minus 1975-85 as some may suggest that past levels over predict current ones. Models 3 and 4 follow the same pattern of two dependent variables, but they exclude the variable of political and civil rights are excluded as the other legacy variables might have determined or influenced the levels of political and civil rights. Models 5 and 6 eliminate all of the variables which were insignificant, found a reduced model where the findings were robust, and then added in each other variable one by one. Models 7 and 8 test only include countries which did not feature majority state ownership of industry within the reduced model set of variables to see if growth predicted there as well.

Models 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variables:	Polciv9505	diff 75/95	polciv9505	diff75/95
Independent Variables				
Intercept	1.7479+ (1.040)	1.748+ (1.039)	2.768+++ (0.708)	0.0725 (0.852)
polciv75	0.379 (0.2397)	-0.621++ (0.240)		
msowomz ⁴³	1.099++ (0.438)	1.099++ (0.438)	0.967++ (0.427)	1.316+++ (0.507)
pleb	0.0197 (0.021)	0.0197 (0.0209)	0.015 (0.021)	0.0275 (0.0269)
comp	-0.0264 (0.0349)	-0.0264 (0.035)	-0.056 (0.037)	0.0216 (0.0431)
military	0.0021 (0.032)	0.0021 (0.032)	-0.0211 (0.033)	0.0403 (0.040)
gdppc85	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0004)	0.00023 (0.0004)
growth 75-85	4.997+++ (1.153)	4.997+++ (1.253)	5.462+++ (1.505)	4.234+++ (1.248)
urban	0.0056 (0.017)	0.0056 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.0006 (0.0198)
ethnolinguistic	0.220 (0.734)	0.220 (0.754)	0.212 (0.832)	0.233 (0.714)
mining/ oil	-0.516 (0.328)	-0.516 (0.382)	-0.627 (0.441)	-0.332 (0.373)
New mining/ oil	-0.724 (0.442)	-0.724 (0.442)	-0.929++ (0.455)	-0.388 (0.407)
Portuguese	0.879 (0.695)	0.879 (0.695)	0.600 (0.694)	1.337+ (0.671)
British	0.623 (0.462)	0.623 (0.462)	1.114+++ (0.419)	-0.184 (0.463)
Belgian	-0.647 (0.469)	-0.647 (0.469)	-0.806++ (0.386)	-0.386 (0.622)
N	43	43	43	43
R-squared	0.559	0.613	0.518	0.517
Corr R-sqr	0.339	0.419	0.302	0.300

1 Numbers are rounded.

	Models			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variables:	Polciv9505	diff 75/95	polciv9505	diff 75/95
Independent Variables			[without countries with majority state ownership of industries]	
Intecept	2.017+++ (0.477)	2.0168+++ (0.477)	1.964+++ (0.4296)	1.965+++ (0.430)
polciv75	0.487++ (0.182)	-0.513+++ (0.1823)	0.505+++ (0.1418)	-0.495+++ (0.142)
msowomz	1.426+++ (0.368)	1.426+++ (0.369)		
growth 75-85	5.053+++ (1.043)	5.226+++ (1.040)	4.967+++ (1.806)	4.967+++ (1.806)
Belgian	-0.927+++ (0.2676)	-0.927+++ (0.268)	-0.906 (0.585)	-0.906 (0.585)

Each additional variable added in one at a time, though none was significant at the 95% levels. This included frequency of protests and number of elections.⁴⁴

N	43	43	28	28
R-squared	0.483	0.546	0.548	0.427
Corr R-sqr	0.428	0.498	0.491	0.356
+++ Significant p <.01				
++ Significant p <.05				

From the models, it does appear that two of the legacy variables can predict changes in political or civil rights from the decade before the transition into the decade afterwards in every model. In fact, both majority state ownership of industry during the 1970s and 1980s and the average percent change in growth (per capita GDP) between 1975 and 1985 were significantly linked with changes in political and civil rights in every estimation (except 8 and 9 where majority state ownership cases were excluded). Countries with majority state ownership were more likely to have higher levels of political and civil rights in the second period as well as high having large differences between the two periods. Also, countries that experienced more growth during the decade of 1975 to 85 were more likely to have increases in political and civil rights from 1995 to 2005.

The sign of previous levels of political and civil rights reversed depending on whether the dependent variable was levels or differences. When the dependent variable was levels, the sign was positive, and the results were usually significant. By contrast, when the dependent variable was the differences in rights between the two periods, the sign reversed and this variable was significant in each estimation. However, this variable was slightly below the 90% cutoff for model 1, though it proved to be robust when fewer variables were included in the model (see models 4-8).

In the reduced models 5-8, which included countries with majority state ownership, the variable of being a former Belgian colony predicted lower levels of political and civil rights, or less democratization. This relationship disappeared when the cases including majority state ownership were excluded. It may have to do with the degrees of freedom.

Some other variables sometimes became significant in models 3 and 4 when the political averages from 1975 -85 were dropped: new oil or mining (Models 3), Belgian colonial past (Models 3, 5 and 6), British colonial past (Model 3), and Portuguese colonial past (model 4). However, the Belgian colonial past variable also was significant in the reduced model of 5 and 6. However, when the more reduced model is used, excluding all of the variables which were never significant, and then adding back in one at a time those variables that had been significant at least once, they all fell away in significance⁴⁵ with majority state ownership of industry, levels of political and civil rights from 1975-85, and the average change in GDP per capita from 1975-85. The same holds true for new oil. The only exception was Belgian for models 5 and 6.

Conclusions

We can offer some preliminary conclusions from these tests. First, in sub-Saharan Africa and comparing the 1975-85 period to the 1995-05 period, some legacy variables can predict later levels of political and civil rights. This is without reference to the unique and path dependent journey that each country took during its transition period. Second, majority state ownership of industry (though in countries without either significant oil or mineral export earnings) during the period of 1975-85 was a strong predictor of more political and civil rights in the second period. Third, the modernization literature suggesting that economic growth can lead to later democratization (or at least liberalization) is supported here; countries which grew during 1975-85 were more likely to have higher political and civil right in the second period, and vice-versa. Lower levels of growth would predict lower levels of later political and civil rights.⁴⁶ Fourth, prior levels of political and civil right were usually a good predictor of later levels – especially

with the dependent variable of differences in levels or less crowded models. So countries that were not free were most likely to become partly free, and those that were partly free were most likely to become free – unless they had been majority state owned. Fifth, levels of political competition and participation in the earlier period had no predictive power in this model.⁴⁷ However, to be fair the test was not done during the transition period, nor did we test “transitions to democracy” per se.

Finally, none of the other included variables had any significant predictive power. Some of it could be due to the relatively truncated nature of the sample. We are testing on political liberalization in the part of the world with the lowest historic level. The variable of per capita income is probably best explained through this. A sample with greater variance in incomes probably would have had more variance in levels of political and civil rights.⁴⁸ This is probably most true for the per capita income variable, which has been shown to be so robust in the past.⁴⁹

Also, neither the theories about ethnolinguistic fractionalization nor the mineral curse were entirely supported here. However, using the logic of neopatrimonialism the non-finding for each could make sense. There should be little variance on either from one period to the other, yet there were significant change in the dependent variable both between the periods and in variance. It may be the case that these variables had their impacts on the legacies of the 1975-85 period. Nonetheless, in model 3, we saw the new mining or oil to matter more in predicting lower levels in the second period.

In sum, the normal holdings that no structural variables can predict later levels of political and civil rights is tested and found not to be accurate in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that previous majority state ownership of industry was statistically predictive of later

increases in rights, as was higher growth rates before the transition period. We also find support for the idea that previous levels of rights are good predictors of later ones, though this variable was not quite significant in model 1.

The logic for majority state ownership is that these political elites had lost access to revenue for the maintenance of patronage politics as their industries did not come to exports, their policies protecting these sectors undermined their traditional export sector, and post Cold War logic meant that external funding was no longer available to authoritarian, statist governments – either from the World Bank or IMF or from international bilateral donors. In fact, the only real increases in money were for countries that liberalized. Their only option was opening politically and economically.

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
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
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Appendix I

Below please find scatter plots linking past levels of freedoms with current ones, but the countries with majority state ownership of industries are in green. As the reader can note, all of the green dots fall below what would be the 45% line.



The second scatter plot also shows political and civil rights plotted against differences. Again the green dots represent countries with majority state ownership but no lucrative mining or oil sectors. As the reader can see, most of the differences that show improvements in rights (negative) are below the zero line. Also, the four with the largest changes were countries with majority state ownership of industry. Also, nine of the ten clearly below the -2 line are all majority state owned as well. Also, of those at or below the -2 line, 11 of the 14 had majority state ownership of industry.



¹ Only Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and Somalia have not held any elections during this period.

² <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf>

³ The sample is from this study. South Africa, Namibia and Eritrea are excluded. The rankings run from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most free and 7 the least.

⁴ Bratton and van de Walle (1997) used such variables as growth (during the transition), levels of protest, intervention of the army, the use of a national conference and so forth.

⁵ This last point is consistent with Huntington (1990), but his book was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

⁶ See for example, W. W. Rostow, 1960; Lipset, 1959; and Bollen and Jackman, 1985, and Przeworski and Limongi 1997.

⁷ For a debate on the relative merits of endogenous and exogenous democratization see, Przeworski et al. 2000, and Boix and Stokes 2003.

⁸ The Gambia was overthrown in a coup in 1994.

⁹ The first and best known work was O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986 for Latin America. For an overview in Africa, see Bratton and van de Walle 1997. For critical assessment, see Carothers 2002.

¹⁰ Bratton and van de Walle (1977) share this assumption for Africa.

¹¹ For larger list of types of democracy, see Collier and Levisky 1997.

¹² White settler is excluded as we exclude Namibia and South Africa. South Africa is excluded as its developmental trajectory was considered quite unique prior to the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Namibia was ruled by South Africa at the time. Also, Namibia did not have freedom house data for the earlier period, and South Africa would have been the only example of white settler polity. Also, political data for Zimbabwe is only from 1980-85 for similar reasons.

¹³ Especially Quinn 2002, 30-43.

¹⁴ He also showed that was tied to higher levels of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency in the 1980s Quinn (2004).

¹⁵ For an overview of Hecksher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson, see Caves and Jones 1973; for their application to politics, see Rogowski 1989

¹⁶ This sample excludes CFA countries as they had no independent control over their currency.

¹⁷ Bates (1999) also argues that countries with natural resources (oil, diamonds, copper, gold, uranium, and timber) which can be taxed and which can remain economically profitable would be less likely to transition to democracy. I only include countries in which minerals or oil are a significant source of exports.

¹⁸ Zambian copper, for example, lost money in the 1990s. See Quinn (2002, 179).

¹⁹ Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Sudan are listed as new oil countries.

²⁰ Perhaps the major exception would be in Zimbabwe where Mugabe dismantled the agricultural sector for political purposes, or a country hit hard by exogenous shocks to agriculture.

²¹ Other scenarios are these: change in leadership in a still quasi-authoritarian system, economic collapse, widespread protests emerging from failures or demonstration effects, political liberalization could lead to more economic reform, or well funded external funding could induce reforms.

²² This coding is available from a variety of sources. I used personal knowledge, but checked it against the Bratton and van de Walle data set. I obtained their data set from The South African Data Archive (ICPSR). Here is the formal citation: International- University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa, 1910 [sic (1989)]- 1994. Michigan, Ann Arbor: ICPSR –producer, 1997. South African Data Archive- distributor, 2000. Although they have Somalia coded as British, its mixture with Italy will leave it as part of the default setting.

²³ We leave out dictator as all of the variables included would lead to the dummy variable trap. Also, with its inclusion, the VIF was >4.

²⁴ Namibia has no data from the first period, and South African was routinely considered to have a distinct developmental trajectory due to its apartheid past. Also, the averaged democracy scores for Zimbabwe run from 1980 to 1985 as they were under white rule until then.

²⁵ Although this variable takes us into the transition period, it is before the end of the Cold War, and it keeps one of Bratton and van de Walle's data cells intact.

²⁶ See Karl and Ross.

²⁷ The variable number of elections was collinear with other variables with a VIF>11.

²⁸ See data at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>. The numbers are subtracted from 8 to be inverted. So the political and civil rights scores were added together and divided by 2. Then the 11 year period was added up and divided by 11.

²⁹ However, Somalia is not listed as British.

³⁰ For the purposes of this analysis, a country as having majority state-ownership when the government own more than 50% or more of most major industries -- usually resulting from explicit programs of nationalization or state investment. Unlike earlier work, this leaves out majority state ownership of oil or mineral sectors. (See Quinn 1999, 2002). The most important sources for coding were these: "The Library of Congress Country Studies Website," at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>; Quinn (2002, 1999); Rood (1976); Africa South of the Sahara, S.V. (various years and countries); and Kennedy (1988); and

Investment Promotion Network at Pananet at www.ipanet.com. One quality control check for this variable comes from Gwartney, Lawson, and Block (1996). They created an index of economic freedom and have one sub-category called government-operated enterprises as a share of the economy. This index runs from 0 to 10. Where it registered a two or less, the dummy variable automatically became a 1 to indicate majority state ownership, regardless of other coding schemes. Where it was an 8 or higher, the dummy variable would become a zero indicating less than majority state ownership. Otherwise, majority state ownership of the most capital-intensive industries was arrived at through content analysis and country specific references. Zambia is included since its mining industry lost money in the 1990s.

³¹ See endnote 22.

³² Chain index, so it is deflated.

³³ This variable is the average of real GDP per capital chain series from Penn World tables, 1975-85. Numbers of Liberia, Somalia, Sudan come from *World Development Report* 1989, average GDP 1965-87, Table 1.

³⁴ Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Sudan are listed as new oil/ mineral countries.

³⁵ The original source was Taylor and Hudson (1972). I obtained them from <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>. Checked in March 2006.

³⁶ The countries listed as having majority state ownership of industry, but without significant mineral resources are these: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Togo. To be a significant exporter of oil or minerals, this would have to constitute at least 40% of export earnings. Zambia is included since it lost money from copper during the 1990s. See Quinn (2002, 179). However, the results are nearly identical with Zambia excluded.

³⁷ These countries include Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zaire (DRC), and Zambia. Again minerals or oil have to consistently contribute 40% or more of export earnings.

³⁸ France is excluded as it introduced multicollinearity into the model, with the Variance Inflation factor (VIF) >4. It needs to be under 4.

³⁹ The VIF was quite high at >11.

⁴⁰ The dates are approximate, but few place the political transitions before 1989 and most scholarship on Africa's transition was well established by 1995.

⁴¹ Namibia has no data from the first period, and South African was routinely considered to have a distinct developmental trajectory due to its apartheid past. Also, the averaged democracy scores for Zimbabwe run from 1980 to 1985 as they were under white rule until then.

⁴² Thus, this view of democracy or democratization has the idea that improvements are improvements as if they are fragments of accountability. See Sklar 1987. Joseph (1999) also raises this debate.

⁴³ Running the same variable without Zambia resulted in the same outcomes vis-à-vis sign and significance.

⁴⁴ See Barro (1999) for a similar procedure.

⁴⁵ Measured at 95% or higher rejection levels or $p < .05$.

⁴⁶ Although not shown here, this was not true for a sub-sample of only countries with majority state ownership of industry.

⁴⁷ I also ran reduced models with only pleb, comp, and military and none of the variables were significant.

⁴⁸ See Geddes (2003). Chapter 3 for effects of regional samples on generalization.

⁴⁹ See W. W. Rostow, 1960; Lipset, 1959; and Bollen and Jackman, 1985, and Przeworski and Limongi 1997.